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"Risking Autonomy: Comparing Teachers And Senior Leaders In England And Turkey" 
Theoretical framework 
Increasing workloads are allowing less time for teachers to recuperate and recover in periods 
of rapid change (Skaalvik & Skaalvik, 2011) leading to teacher, teacher compliance and loss 
of motivation, pride and creativity (Lundström, 2015). Engagement in decision-making can be 
both a solution, where this facilitates a sense of teacher autonomy, or a problem, where 
engagement in decision-making becomes an additional burden against a heavy workload (Van 
Droogenbroeck, Spruyt, & Vanroelen, 2014). As Pietarinen et al. (2013) argue, workload 
distress is exacerbated where teachers feel a lack of control, meaninglessness and a sense of 
unfairness.  
 
In an effort to secure the delivery of high quality education in schools, many countries have 
implemented systems of educational regulation (Eurydice, 2004). Whether such control 
mechanisms are efficient, effective, or even practicable, have been the subject of debate over 
the past two decades (De Wolf & Janssens, 2007). Moreover, professional accountability in 
education is in crisis, challenged by managerial hierarchy and the market.  
 
Teachers are central actors in an increasingly complex web of accountability 
relationships based on external controls and professional autonomy…(Mattei, 
2012, p. 249) 
De Wolf and Janssens (2007) point out that there are many disadvantages to using 
accountability mechanisms, such as, misrepresentation, proceduralisation, teaching to the test, 
performing for inspection, myopia, ossification and stress. Furthermore, school inspections 
increase the pressure exerted by the inspection system (Jones et al., 2017). Therefore, the 
process of holding schools to account can impose high costs without securing substantial 
benefits (O’Neill, 2013).  
 
In order to be accepted as autonomous, teachers need to be “allowed to work with their students, 
free from the pressures of strict standards, external national tests, public league tables, or 
inspection systems” (Ropo & Välijärvi, 2010, p. 214). Whilst governments generally define 
the boundaries of autonomy in schools (Eck & Goodwin, 2010), different levels of public 
regulation provide an explanation for why experiences of school autonomy vary between 
countries (Glenn, 2005). The PISA 2015 results indicated that school leaders in Macao-China, 
the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Lithuania and in the United Kingdom reported the highest 
level of autonomy in their schools. In contrast, autonomy was considered to be limited in 
Greece, Jordan, Tunisia and Turkey (OECD, 2016). This would seem to indicate that high 
government regulation can be associated with low school autonomy (Greany & Waterhouse, 
2016). 
 
Greater ‘autonomy' however, brings with it a raft of new ‘constraints’ for all staff across the 
teaching profession and,  
 
school leaders with increased autonomy find themselves differently positioned 
and their responses to competitive and performative demands and expectations 
range from acquiescence and strategic compliance to outright resistance (Gobby 
et al., 2018, p.160).  
Moreover, power is distributed towards markets at the expense of individual teacher autonomy 
thereby eroding trust and degrading the autonomy of teaching as a profession (Lundström, 
2015). 
 
This paper focuses on issues of autonomy and accountability in two different contexts. We 
look at data gathered from school teachers and senior leaders from one high autonomy, high 
accountability context, England and one low autonomy, low accountability context, Turkey. 
Through exploring change management in both settings, we argue that there are many 
similarities between the two apparently different contexts which raise questions about the 
extent to which teachers in England are indeed autonomous and we also question the apparent 
lack of autonomy that teachers in Turkey can exercise. 
Methodology 
The data presented from England represents a study of 21 schools including both primary 
(pupils aged 4-11) and high schools (pupils aged 11-16). The data presented are drawn from 
semi-structured interviews with 42 educators working within these schools. The educators 
included senior leaders (headteachers and deputy heads) and teachers. Interview questions were 
established to investigate the ways in which accountability and assessment agendas interplayed 
with agendas for school change and educators’ sense of autonomy. These questions were then 
adopted by the Turkish research team in order to gather some equivalent and comparable data. 
The Turkish team focussed on lower (aged 10-13) and upper (aged 14-17) secondary school 
settings drawing data from 12 schools and 36 educators. The educators ranged from senior 
leaders (principals) to teachers. Clearly only a selection of the data is presented here but is 
drawn upon because it represents the majority of responses around the topic of autonomy or 
the extremes within the data.  
 
For the English study, schools included were either part of a large Multi-Academy Trust or 
from a Teaching School Alliance covering schools from the south to the north of the country 
and representing a range of inspection outcomes. In Turkey schools were identified from the 
Eskisehir district. Schools were selected to represent diversity in relation to student scores in 
their Transition to High School Exams (THSE) tests and a range of socio-economic 
backgrounds based on information obtained from Eskisehir Provincial Directorate of National 
Education.  
Semi-structured interviews “directly solicit the perspectives of the people we wish to study” 
(Saldaña, 2011, p. 75) and allowed for the description, explanation, understanding, 
interpretation and rich critique to be garnered as part of the data gathering process (Creswell, 
2013). Participants in both settings were recruited on the basis of their willingness to be 
interviewed. Ethical permissions were obtained, and interviews conducted on the basis of 
informed consent (Creswell, 2013). Interviews were voice recorded and lasted between 29 
and 54 minutes. The Turkish interviews were translated into English, and read through by a 
native English speaker in order to address questions around understandings and 
interpretations. We worked both separately and then together to draw out thematic categories 
from these data. Texts were read and re-read to facilitate the power of the participants voices 
whilst targeting “specific problems in specific substantive areas” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 250). 
Conclusions 
Both systems governed through externally developed curricular. This is monitored through 
accountability regimes in England and strong policy level control in Turkey. Heads and 
principals in both countries demonstrated potential distance between senior leadership and the 
rest of the teaching staff through language that set them apart, senior leaders adopting varying 
degrees of authoritativeness. There were also some similarities in the senior leader’s expressed 
need for compliant staff, albeit the heads in England being more cautious about how they 
expressed this wish. Agendas of compliance resulted in clashes through teacher resistance in 
Turkey and a more coercive, responsibilising approach in England. There also appeared to be 
problems with both the rigidity of the accountability system in England, which makes notions 
of autonomy a rhetorical ‘slight of hand’, and the loose system of Turkey where converting 
policy into practice is not investigated or assessed. Whilst it is necessary for schools to be 
professionally accountable given their remit to educate our children (Van Droogenbroeck et al, 
2014), it seems important to recognise that teachers will always need freedoms to educate in a 
flexible way and through a lively and enriched curriculum that stimulates both the children and 
the staff in schools. The data here indicates that neither high or low accountability seems 
capable of delivering such an agenda because both impact negatively on teacher autonomy.  
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